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Abstract. Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific charac-
teristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to sup-
port decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. 
This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview 
different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their 
objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define 
the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the ac-
tion to be performed. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market 
simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been 
tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Market are pre-
sented and discussed. 
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1.  Introduction 
All over the world electricity restructuring placed 
several challenges to governments and to the compa-
nies that are involved in generation, transmission and 
distribution of electrical energy. Potential benefits, 
however, depend on the efficient operation of the 
market. Definition of the market structure implies a 
set of complex rules and regulations that should not 
encourage strategic behaviors that might reduce mar-
ket performance and lead to market power [23]. In-
terveners need to rethink their strategies and behavior. 
Several market models exists, with different rules 
and performances creating the need to foresee market 
behavior, regulators want to test the rules before they 
are implemented and market players need to under-
stand the market so they may reap the benefits of a 
well-planned action .  
Usually, during the recent years, electricity market 
players use rather simple strategic behaviors. Most 
entities keep their biddings constant along the time, 
while others base their proposed prices in the genera-
tion costs of their installations. The most elaborated 
strategic behaviors go no further than performing 
simple averages or regressions of the historic market 
prices. This matter, an highly unexplored and unim-
plemented issue, of huge importance for the maximi-
zation of players profits, supports the need for the 
development of proper market acting strategies. 
The main contribution of this work is to comple-
ment the Multi-Agent Simulator for Electricity Mar-
kets (MASCEM) [19, 25] simulator. MASCEM is a 
modeling and simulation tool that has been devel-
oped by this team for the purpose of studying com-
plex restructured electricity markets operation. 
MASCEM’s ability to model the most relevant mar-
ket players and negotiation mechanisms provides the 
means for an adequate development and study of 
models and techniques to support market players’ 
actions in the best possible way. It provides market 
players with simulation and decision-support re-
sources, being able to give them competitive ad-
vantage in the market. 
The contribution is provided through the develop-
ment of a new computational model, implemented to 
support the development of dynamic pricing strate-
gies, taking advantage of the interactive environment 
between market agents and on the gathered 
knowledge during market participation. The method-
ology is characterized as a scenario analysis algo-
rithm able to support players’ strategic behavior. The 
proposed model includes four innovative components 
which arise as separate, however, complementary 
contributions: (i) scenarios definition, concerning the 
automatic creation of distinct market scenarios based 
on different perspectives and potential states of the 
electricity market evolution along the time; (ii) play-
ers profiles definition, which is an independent com-
putational model directed to the creation of competi-
tor players’ models, in what concerns their character-
istics and expected behavior, performing analysis and 
forecasts of their current and past observed actions 
and continuously gathered information; (iii) possible 
actions definition, aiming at establishing a set of co-
herent and realistic possibilities of actions for the 
supported player to take on an electricity market en-
vironment, taking into account each current context 
(concerning market and competitor players’ states at 
each point in time); (iv) adaptation of the game-
theory concept [5, 16] to the electricity market nego-
tiation environment, both concerning bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral negotiations, which is a major contribu-
tion by itself, in a sense that this adaptation concerns 
such a dynamic and specific context, with so many 
particularities and constraints. 
After this introductory section, Section 2 introduc-
es the theme of multi-agent simulation in electricity 
markets, outlining the main features of MASCEM, 
providing an essential insight of this simulator, con-
tributing to an adequate understanding of the simu-
lated multi-agent environment, in order to properly 
expose the advantages of the proposed work; Section 
3 explores the proposed computational model, in-
cluding the game theory approach for scenario analy-
sis; Section 4 presents a case study based on real 
electricity market data, testing the proposed models 
and comparing its results with the results for the 
same scenario using other two well established meth-
odologies for decision support of players acting in 
electricity markets. Finally Section 5 presents the 
most relevant conclusions and contributions of this 
paper. 
2.  Multi-Agent simulation of competitive 
electricity markets 
The employment of simulation tools is a very ade-
quate way to find market inefficiencies or to provide 
support for market players’ decision. Multi-agent 
based simulation is particularly well fitted to analyze 
dynamic and adaptive systems with complex interac-
tions among constituents [2, 6, 20]. With multi-agent 
simulation tools individual behaviors, as well as sys-
tem behavior and how individual behaviors affect it, 
may be studied in a model that may be enlarged dy-
namically to accomplish new rules or participants.  
Indeed several multi-agent tools have been fruit-
fully applied to the study of restructured wholesale 
power markets [2, 6, 14, 15, 19, 20]. Some of the 
most relevant tools in this domain are: 
 Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System 
(EMCAS) [14]: software agents with negotiation 
competence use strategies based on machine-
learning and adaptation to simulate Electricity 
Markets. 
 Agent-based Modelling of Electricity Systems 
(AMES ) [15]: open-source computational labo-
ratory for studying wholesale power markets, re-
structured in accordance with U.S. Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission (FERC); It uses an 
agent-base test bed with strategically learning 
electric power traders to experimentally test the 
extent to which commonly used seller market 
power and market efficiency measures are in-
formative for restructured wholesale power mar-
kets. 
MASCEM was presented to the scientific commu-
nity in 2003 [19], combining agent based-modeling 
and simulation. In its initial form MASCEM provid-
ed the modeling of the most relevant entities that 
participate in electricity markets, as well as some of 
the most common market mechanism found world-
wide. One of MASCEM’s objectives is to be able to 
simulate as many market models and players types as 
possible so it can reproduce in a realistic way the 
operation of real electricity markets. This enables it 
to be used as a simulation and decision-support tool 
for short/medium term purposes but also as a tool to 
support long-term decisions, such as the ones taken 
by regulators. MASCEM includes several negotiation 
mechanisms usually found in electricity markets [22]. 
It can simulate several types of markets, namely: 
pool markets, bilateral contracts, balancing markets 
and forward markets. This implies that each agent 
must decide whether to, and how to, participate in 
each market type. 
In 2011 a new enhanced version of MASCEM arose 
[25], where agents use several distinct strategies 
when negotiating in the market and learning mecha-
nisms in order to best fulfill their objectives. Alt-
hough MASCEM’s purpose is not to explicitly search 
for equilibrium points, but to help understand the 
complex and aggregate system behaviors that emerge 
from the interactions of heterogeneous individuals, 
agents learn and adapt their strategies during a simu-
lation, thus possibly converging toward equilibrium.  
There are also several entities involved in the ne-
gotiations in the scope of electricity markets; 
MASCEM multi-agent model represents all the in-
volved entities and their relationships. MASCEM 
model includes: a Market Facilitator Agent, Seller 
Agents, Buyer Agents, Virtual Power Producer 
(VPP) [26] Agents, VPP Facilitator Agents, a Market 
Operator Agent and a System Operator Agent.  
2.1.  MASCEM strategies for competitor players 
profiles definition 
In order to build suitable profiles of competitor 
agents, it is essential to provide players with strate-
gies capable of dealing with the constant changes in 
competitors’ behavior, allowing adaptation to their 
actions and reactions. For that, it is necessary to have 
adequate forecasting techniques to analyze the data 
properly, namely the historic of other agents past 
actions. The way each agent bid is predicted can be 
approached in several ways, namely through the use 
of statistical methods, data mining techniques [7, 21,  
24], neural networks (NN) [1, 11], support vector 
machines (SVM) [27], or several other methods [4, 
12]. But since the other agents can be gifted with 
intelligent behavior as well, and able to adapt to the 
circumstances, there is no method that can be said to 
be the best for every situation, only the best for one 
or other particular case.  
To take advantage of the best characteristics of 
each technique, we decided to create a method that 
integrates several distinct technologies and approach-
es. The method consists of the use of several fore-
casting algorithms, all providing their predictions, 
and, on top of that, a reinforcement learning algo-
rithm that chooses the one that is most likely to pre-
sent the best answer. This choice is done according to 
the past experience of their responses and also to the 
present characteristics of each situation, such as the 
week day, the period, and the particular market con-
text in which the players are acting. 
The main reinforcement algorithm presents a dis-
tinct set of statistics for each acting agent, for their 
actions to be predicted independently from each other, 
and also for each period. This means that an algo-
rithm that may be presenting good results for a cer-
tain agent in a given period, with its output chosen 
more often when bidding for this period, may possi-
bly never be chosen as the answer for another period. 
The tendencies observed when looking at the historic 
of negotiation periods independently from each other 
show that they vary much from each other, what sug-
gests that distinct algorithms can present distinct lev-
els of results when dealing with such different 
tendencies. 
The way the statistics are updated, and conse-
quently the best answer chosen, can be defined by the 
user. MASCEM provides three alternative rein-
forcement learning algorithms, all having in common 
the starting point. All the algorithms start with the 
same value of confidence, and then, according to 
their particular performance, that value is updated. 
All forecasting algorithms also have the option of 
being attributed a weight value that defines its im-
portance to the system. This means that a strategy 
that has a higher weight value will detach faster from 
the rest in case of either success or failure. The three 
versions are: 
 A simple reinforcement learning algorithm, in 
which the updating of the values is done through 
a direct decrement of the confidence value C in 
the time t, according to the absolute value of the 
difference between the prediction P and the real 
value R. The updating of the values is expressed 
by (1). 
 1t tC C R P     (1) 
 The revised Roth-Erev reinforcement learning 
algorithm [12] that, besides the features of the 
previous algorithm, also includes a weight value 
W, ranging from 0 to 1, for the definition of the 
importance of past experience. This version is 
expressed as in (2). 
   1 1t tC C W R P W        (2) 
 A learning algorithm based on the Bayes theo-
rem of probability [8], in which the updating of 
the values is done through the propagation of the 
probability of each algorithm being successful 
given the facts of its past performance. The ex-
pected utility, or expected success of each algo-
rithm is given by (3), being E the available evi-
dences, A an action with possible outcomes Oi, 
U(Oi|A) the utility of each of the outcome states 
given that action A is taken, P(Oi|E,A) the con-
ditional probability distribution over the possi-
ble outcome states, given that evidence E is ob-
served and action A taken. 
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(3) 
The algorithms used for the predictions are: 
 A feed-forward neural network trained with the 
historic market prices, with an input layer of 
eight units, regarding the prices and powers of 
the same period of the previous day, and the 
same week days of the previous three weeks. 
The intermediate hidden layer has four units and 
the output has one unit – the predicted bid price 
of the analyzed agent for the period in question. 
 Based on Statistical approaches. There are five 
strategies in this category: 
 Average of prices and powers from the 
agents’ past actions database, using the data 
from the 30 days prior to the current simula-
tion day, considering only the same period as 
the current case, of the same week day. This 
allows us to have a strategy based on the 
tendencies per week day and per period;  
 Average of the agent’s bid prices considering 
the data from one week prior to the current 
simulation day, considering only business 
days, and only the same period as the current 
case. This strategy is only performed when 
the simulation is at a business day. This ap-
proach, considering only the most recent days 
and ignoring the distant past, gives us a pro-
posal that can very quickly adapt to the most 
recent changes in this agent’s behavior. And 
is also a good strategy for agents that tend to 
perform similar actions along the week; 
 Average of the data from the four months pri-
or to the current simulation day, considering 
only the same period as the current case. This 
offers an approach based on a longer term 
analysis. Even though this type of strategies, 
based on averages, may seem too simple, they 
present good results when forecasting players’ 
behaviors, taking only a small amount of time 
for their execution; 
 Regression on the data from the four months 
prior to the current simulation day, consider-
ing only the same period of the day; 
 Regression on the data of the last week, con-
sidering only business days. This strategy is 
only performed when the simulation is at a 
business day. 
 Algorithms based on pattern analysis: 
 Sequences in the past matching the last few 
actions. In this approach are considered the 
sequences of at least 3 actions found along the 
historic of actions of this player. The se-
quences are treated depending on their size. 
The longer matches to the recent history are 
attributed a higher importance;  
 Most repeated sequence along the historic of 
actions of this player; 
 Most recent sequence among all the found 
ones. 
 Algorithm based on history matching. Regard-
ing not only the player actions, but also the re-
sult they obtained. This algorithm finds the pre-
vious time that the last result happened, i.e., 
what the player did, or how he reacted, the last 
time he performed the same action and got the 
same result. 
 Algorithm returning the most repeated action of 
this player. This is an efficient method for play-
ers that tend to perform recurrent actions. 
 Second-Guessing the predictions. Assuming that 
the players whose actions we are predicting are 
gifted with intelligent behavior, it is essential to 
shield this system, avoiding being predictable as 
well. So this strategy aims to be prepared to sit-
uations when the competitors are expecting the 
actions that the system is performing. 
 Second-Guess: if the prediction on a player 
action is P, and it is expecting the system to 
perform an action P1 that will overcome its 
expected action, so in fact the player will per-
form an action P2 that overcomes the sys-
tem’s expected P1. This strategy prediction is 
the P2 action, in order for the system to ex-
pect the player’s prediction;  
 Third-Guess: this is one step above the previ-
ous strategy. If a player already understood 
the system’s second guess and is expecting 
the system to perform an action that over-
comes the P2 action, than it will perform an 
action P3 that overcomes the system predic-
tion, and so, this strategy returns P3 as the 
predicted player action. 
 Self Model prediction. Once again if a player is 
gifted with intelligent behavior, it can perform 
the same historical analysis on the system’s be-
havior as the system performs on the others. 
This strategy performs an analysis on its own 
historic of actions, to predict what itself is ex-
pected to do next. From that the system can 
change its predicted action, to overcome the 
players that may be expecting it to perform that 
same predicted action. 
Second-Guess the Self Model prediction. The same 
logic is applied as before, this time considering the 
expected play resulting from the Self Model predic-
tion. 
 
3. Game Theory based Scenario Analysis 
The scenario analysis algorithm supports strategic 
behavior with the aim of providing complex support 
to develop and implement dynamic pricing strategies.  
Each agent develops a strategic bid, taking into ac-
count not only its previous results but also other 
players’ bids and results and expected future reac-
tions. This is particularly suitable for markets based 
on a pool or for hybrid markets, to support Sellers 
and Buyers decisions for proposing bids to the pool 
and accepting or not a bilateral agreement. The algo-
rithm is based on the analysis of several bids under 
different scenarios. The analysis results are used to 
build a matrix which supports the application of a 
decision method to select the bid to propose. Each 
agent has historical information about market behav-
ior and about other agents’ characteristics and past 
actions. This algorithm’s organization is presented in 
Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Scenario Analysis Algorithm. 
 
To get warrantable data, agents using this method 
perform an analysis of the historical data. With the 
gathered information, agents can build a profile of 
other agents including information about their ex-
pected proposed prices, limit prices, and capacities. 
With these profiles, and based on the agent own ob-
jectives, several scenarios, and the possible advanta-
geous bids for each one, are defined.  
Seller and Buyer agents interact with each other, in 
MASCEM environment, taking into account that 
their results are influenced by competitor’s decisions. 
Game theory is well suited for analyzing these kinds 
of situations [5, 16]. 
3.1.  Scenario definition 
MASCEM is implemented as a Decision Support 
tool, so the user should have the flexibility to decide 
how many and which scenarios should be analyzed. 
To do so, the user must define the scenarios to be 
simulated by specifying the price that competitor 
agents will propose (4): 
 
Pricei =    Probable_Pricei +    Limit_Pricei, 
,  +  = 1 
(4) 
where  and  are scaling factors that can be different 
for each agent and for each scenario.  
Let us suppose that the user selects =0 and =1 for 
every Seller and =1 and =0 for every Buyer; this 
means an analysis of a pessimistic scenario. If the 
user selects =1 and =0 for every agent, then the 
most probable scenario will be analyzed. Using this 
formula the user can define for each agent the pro-
posed prices for every scenario that it desires to con-
sider. 
The Probable_Price is a predicted value concerning 
the expected bidding price of each competitor player. 
This prediction is reached by using the players’ pro-
files definition mechanism, presented in section 2. 
This prediction allows the proposed method to use 
adequate and realistic values when considering other 
players’ actions. 
The Limit_Price corresponds to maximum price that 
can be bided by a seller agent, or the minimum price 
that can be bided by a buyer agent.  
Each scenario considers a fixed number of players, 
each with constant amounts of power. Only the bid-
ding prices for each player vary from scenario to sce-
nario. 
3.2. Bid definition 
An agent should analyze the income that results 
from bidding its limit, desired, and competitive prices 
- those that are just slightly lower (or higher, in the 
buyers’ case) than its competitors’ prices. 
A play is defined as a pair of bid – scenario, so, the 
total number of plays to analyze for each player is 
(5): 
n = number_of_bids   number_of_scenarios (5) 
and the maximum value it can achieve is (6): 
 2 2 2nn    (6) 
considering that agents only bid their limit or ex-
pected prices. However, an agent may bid prices be-
tween its limit and expected prices, or even above 
that limit price. If we consider each agent may bid 
numprices prices, the number of scenarios becomes 
equal to npn, and the number of plays to analyze is 
(7). 
 2 nnumprices n numprices    (7) 
The user is also allowed to choose the number of 
bids that will be considered as possibilities for the 
final bid. In this case, the value of the bids is calcu-
lated depending on an interval of values that can also 
be defined by the user. That interval is always cen-
tered on a trusted value, the value of the market price 
of the same period of the previous day. In this way 
the considered possible bids are always around that 
reference value, and their range of variance depends 
on the bigger or smaller value of the user defined 
interval. 
So, being nb the number of bids defined by the us-
er, int the value defining the interval to be considered, 
and mp the market price from the same period of the 
previous day, the possible bids b1..nb are defined as 
(8) and (9): 
   1b
2
int
mp   (8) 
 , 2,
1
m m-1
int
b b m nb
nb
 
   
 
 (9) 
After defining all the scenarios and bids, market 
simulation is applied to build a matrix with the ex-
pected results for each play. 
The matrix analysis with the simulated plays’ re-
sults is inspired on the game theory concepts for a 
pure-strategy two-player game, assuming each player 
seeks to minimize the maximum possible loss or 
maximize the minimum possible gain.  
After each negotiation period, an agent may in-
crease, decrease or maintain its bid, increasing the 
number of scenarios to analyze. So, after k periods, 
considering only three possible bid updates, the 
number of plays to analyze becomes (10): 
  ( 1)2 3n k nnp n np       (10) 
Game Theory for scenario analysis 
A seller, like an offensive player, will try to max-
imize the minimum possible gain by using the 
MaxiMin decision method. A buyer, like a defensive 
player, will select the strategy with the smallest max-
imum payoff by using the MiniMax decision method.  
Buyers’ matrix analysis leads to the selection of 
only those situations in which all the consumption 
needs are fulfilled. This avoids situations in which 
agents have reduced expenses but cannot satisfy their 
consumption needs completely. 
The state space to be searched is related to the pos-
sible plays of other agents, regarding possible bids 
from one agent. Fig. 2 illustrates this procedure. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Game theory for scenario-space search. 
 
Each bid of a specific agent (e.g. Agi) is analyzed 
by considering several possible scenarios, in order to 
support the decision of this agent. The scenarios are 
evaluated by considering the prices other agents may 
propose, regarding the previous proposed prices. It is 
also considered that each agent may change its price: 
increasing a lot (↑↑), increasing a little (↑), maintain-
ing (─), decreasing a little (↓), or decreasing a lot 
(↓↓) its bid price (A little means from 0 to 10% and a 
lot from 10% to 30%). Here the concepts of little and 
lot will consider the historic data of agents’ bids and 
will be converted to variations in cents. It is im-
portant to observe that it is impossible to consider all 
kind of variations, due to the complexity of the prob-
lem, as we have seen before. The required time for 
solving the problem with a large set of combinations 
would be impractical since a complete market simu-
lation is required for each scenario. 
Each leaf node of the tree in Fig. 2 corresponds to 
a possible scenario. The idea is to evaluate each one 
of these scenarios and apply a MiniMax or MaxiMin 
based algorithm to select the safest bid to be offered 
by agent Agi. 
Notice that our use of game theory is intended for 
supporting one specific agent and not for achieving 
the equilibrium in the market. The idea of the meth-
odology proposed in this paper is to provide a specif-
ic agent with decision support.  
For each simulated scenario (leaf of Fig. 2) we will 
calculate the price Pmarket for each MW.h (Megawatt 
hour), defined as the result of the simulated market. 
For the support of seller agents the evaluation of the 
scenario (in profits, F) is made by the product of the 
energy sold by the supported agent Agi, Energy_Soldi, 
by the profit, obtained from the difference between 
Pmarket and the cost associated to each MW.h sold by 
Agi, Costi, according to (11): 
)(_ imarketi CostPsoldEnergyF   (11) 
Notice that the part of this formula that demands 
the higher processing cost is the calculation of the 
value Pmarket, since it implies to run the simulation of 
the scenario in order to determine the market clearing 
price. 
Additionally, there are two methods for solving 
problems of equality in the evaluation of scenarios. 
In case of a seller, the MaxiMin algorithm chooses 
the bid that offers the maximum gain, from the worst 
possible scenario. In case of more than one scenario 
being evaluated with equal value as worst scenario, 
the options for choosing among them are: 
A greedy approach, choosing the scenario, among 
the equally worst ones, that presents the bid that al-
lows the higher payoff from all the possible bids; 
An average of the results of all possible bids for 
these scenarios, choosing the one that gets the worst 
average as the worst possible scenario. 
The user is able to choose among these two meth-
ods for solving the problems of equality. He can also 
choose a third option that is a mechanism that choos-
es automatically among these two options, according-
ly to the success that each of them is presenting. This 
mechanism uses a reinforcement learning algorithm, 
with initial equal values of confidence for the two 
options. As the time evolves, the values of success of 
each option are updated, and the one that presents the 
best confidence in each run, is the one chosen. 
The updating of these confidence values is per-
formed by running the two options and saving the 
answer proposed by each one. Later, after the bid is 
chosen as the agent’s action for the actual market, 
this method analyzes the market values and checks 
which of the outputs proposed by each method would 
have led to the best results. 
This procedure is similar to the one used for updat-
ing the values of the players’ profile definition meth-
odology, by comparing the values proposed by each 
of the algorithms used for forecasting with the actual 
actions the each player performed in the market.  
The scenario analysis algorithm is implemented in 
JAVA
1
, for a smoother integration with MASCEM 
simulator. However, for efficiency issues, the majori-
ty of data analysis methods, namely the pattern anal-
ysis and history matching algorithms for players’ 
profiles definition, are implemented in LPA Prolog
2
. 
The neural network was developed in MatLab
3
 
4.  Experimental findings 
This section presents three simulations undertaken 
using MASCEM, referring to the same 16 consecu-
tive days, starting from Friday, 15th October, 2010. 
The data used in this case study has been based on 
real data extracted from the Iberian market – OMIE 
[17].  
These simulations involve 7 buyers and 5 sellers 
(3 regular sellers and 2 VPPs). This group of agents 
was created with the intention of representing the 
Spanish reality, reduced to a smaller group, contain-
ing the essential aspects of different parts of the mar-
ket, allowing a better individual analysis and study of 
the interactions and potentiality of each of those ac-
tors. This group of agents results from the studies 
presented in [25]. 
For these simulations we will consider different 
biddings for each agent. Seller 2, which will be our 
test reference, will use the proposed method with 
different parameters in each of the three simulations. 
This allows comparing the performance of this meth-
od when using distinct parameterizations and taking 
conclusions on its suitability and the influence of the 
different parameters presented in Section 3. This sec-
tion additionally presents the comparison between 
the results obtained by each of the three considered 
parameterizations and the results obtained by using 
two other strategies which are well established and 
with verified performance and results, in order to 
determine in what degree the proposed game theory 
based strategy is best or worst suited for providing 
decision support to market players. These strategies 
are: 
 The AMES strategy is used by the AMES elec-
tricity markets simulator [15] to provide support 
to the modelled players when bidding in the 
market. This strategy is based on a study of the 
                                                          
1
 http://www.java.com/ 
2 
http://www.lpa.co.uk/ 
3
 http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab 
efficiency and reliability of the Wholesale Pow-
er Market Platform (WPMP), a market design 
proposed by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission for common adoption by all U.S. 
wholesale power markets [9, 10]. The AMES 
strategy was adapted by the authors of this paper 
in a previous work [18], to suit it to the purposes 
of asymmetrical and symmetrical pool markets, 
such as the Iberian Market – OMIE [17]. This 
strategy uses a reinforcement learning algorithm 
- the Roth-Erev algorithm [12] to choose from a 
set of the possible actions (or Action Domain) 
which is based on the companies’ production 
costs analysis. Additionally, the Simulated An-
nealing heuristic [3] is implemented to acceler-
ate the convergence process. 
 The SA-QL strategy [24] is similar to the AMES 
strategy in its fundamentals: the use of a rein-
forcement learning algorithm to choose the best 
from a set of possible actions. The differences 
concern two main aspects: the used reinforce-
ment learning algorithm is the Q-Learning [13] 
algorithm; and the set of different possible bids 
to be used by the market negotiating agent is de-
termined by a focus on the most probable points 
of success (in the area surrounding the expected 
market price). This strategy also uses the Simu-
lated Annealing heuristic to accelerate the pro-
cess of convergence. 
 
The common parameters in all the simulations us-
ing the game theory strategy are: the selection of the 
automatic mechanism for solving the problems of 
equality among scenarios; for all seller agents the 
limit price is fixed as 0 c€/kWh, for it does not make 
sense to bid negative values; for all buyer agents the 
limit price is 20 c€/kWh, a high value for allowing 
the players to consider a good margin of prices. Also, 
the selected reinforcement learning algorithm for the 
players’ profiles definition has been the revised Roth-
Erev, with equal value of the algorithms weight. The 
past experience weight W value is set to 0.4, a small 
value to grant higher influence to the most recent 
results, so that it can quickly learn and catch new 
tendencies in players’ actions. For each scenario the 
scaling factors for competitors’ probable price  and 
limit price , will be equal for every competitor agent, 
in order to give the same importance to the price 
forecast of each agent. These scaling factors will only 
vary from scenario to scenario, but always maintain-
ing the equality among agents. 
 
The variations introduced in each simulation are: 
 In the first simulation Seller 2 will use the sce-
nario analysis method with a small number of 
considered scenarios and possible bids. This test 
will allow us to perceive if a restrict group of 
scenarios, and consequent advantage in pro-
cessing speed, will be reflected on a big differ-
ence in the results quality. For this simulation 
the number of considered scenarios is 3, the 
number of considered bids is 5, and the interval 
for the possible bids definition is 8. Considering 
the 3 scenarios, the first will attribute to all 
agents =1 and =0; the second =0,95 and 
=0,05; and the third =0,9 and =0,1. These 
values give higher importance to the most prob-
able prices, in order to consider the most realis-
tic scenarios. 
 In the second simulation Seller 2 will use the 
scenario analysis method with an intermediate 
number of considered scenarios and possible 
bids. The number of considered scenarios is 5, 
the number of considered bids is 7, and the in-
terval for the possible bids definition is 8. Con-
sidering the 5 scenarios, the first will attribute to 
all agents =1 and =0; the second =0,95 and 
=0,05; the third =0,9 and =0,1; the fourth 
=0,8 and =0,2; and the fifth =0,7 and =0,3. 
 Finally, in the third simulation Seller 2 will use 
the method with a higher number of considered 
scenarios and possible bids, in order to obtain a 
more detailed analysis. The number of consid-
ered scenarios is 7, the number of considered 
bids is 10, and the interval for the possible bids 
definition is 10, granting also a bigger interval 
for considered bids. Considering the 7 scenarios, 
the first will attribute to all agents =1 and =0; 
the second =0,95 and =0,05; the third =0,9 
and =0,1; the fourth =0,8 and =0,2; the fifth 
=0,7 and =0,3; the sixth =0,5 and =0,5; 
and the seventh =0,2 and =0,8. 
After the simulations, the incomes obtained by 
Seller 2 using the proposed method with each of 
the three combinations of parameters can be com-
pared. This agent’s power production to be negoti-
ated in the market will remain constant at 50MW 
for each period throughout the simulations. Re-
garding the costs of all players, they are defined as 
null, for facilitating the comparison of the results. 
The other players’ bids are defined as follows: 
 Buyer 1 – This buyer buys power independently 
of the market price. The offer price is 18.30 
c€/kWh (this value is much higher than average 
market price). 
 Buyer 2 – This buyer bid price varies between 
two fixed prices, depending on the periods when 
it really needs to buy, and the ones in which the 
need is lower. The two variations are 10.00 and 
8.00 c€/kWh. 
 Buyer 3 – This buyer bid price is fixed at 4.90 
c€/kWh. 
 Buyer 4 – This buyer bid considers the average 
prices of the last 4 Wednesdays. 
 Buyer 5 – This buyer bid considers the average 
prices of the last 4 months. 
 Buyer 6 – This buyer bid considers the average 
prices of the last week (considering only busi-
ness days). 
 Buyer 7 – This buyer only buys power if market 
prices are lower than average market price. 
 Seller 1 – This seller needs to sell all the power 
that he produces. The offer price is 0.00 c€/kWh. 
 Seller 3 – This seller bid considers the average 
prices of the last 4 months with an increment of 
0.5 c€/kWh. 
 VPP 1 – Includes 4 wind farms and offers a 
fixed value along the day. The offer price is 3.50 
c€/kWh. 
 VPP 2 – Includes 1 photovoltaic, 1 co-
generation and 1 mini-hydro plants; the offer 
price is based on the costs of co-generation and 
the total forecasted production. 
Since the reinforcement learning algorithm for the 
players’ profiles definition treats each period of 
the day as a distinct case, the analysis of the de-
velopment of the performance must be done for 
each period individually. Fig. 3 presents the evolu-
tion of Seller 2 incomes in the first period of each 
considered day, along the 16 days, using each of 
the three considered combinations of parameters. 
a) 
 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Incomes obtained by Seller 2 in the first period of the con-
sidered 16 days, using: a) the first parameterization, b) the second 
parameterization, c) the third parameterization. 
Fig. 4 presents the results of Seller 2 in the twelfth 
period of each considered day. 
 
a) 
b) 
c) 
 
Fig. 4 Incomes obtained by Seller 2 in the twelfth period of the 
considered 16 days, using: a) the first parameterization, b) the 
second parameterization, c) the third parameterization. 
 
Comparing the graphs presented in Fig. 3, it can be 
concluded that the first simulation was clearly the 
most disadvantageous for Seller 2 for this period. The 
second and third simulations present very similar 
results in what concerns the incomes obtained by this 
agent in the first period. 
The results of the twelfth period show the first pa-
rameterization worst results when compared with the 
other two. However, in this case, the third parameter-
ization clearly obtained better results than the second 
one. The global results for all periods of the consid-
ered 16 days, presented in Fig. 5, support this ten-
dency. Fig. 5 additionally presents the comparison 
between the three parameterizations of the game the-
ory strategy and the other two strategies’ perfor-
mance: The AMES strategy, and the SA-QL. 
 
 Fig. 5. Total incomes obtained by Seller 2 for the considered 16 
days. 
 
From Fig. 5 it is visible that the first parameteriza-
tion presents a large difference from the other two, 
and a smaller difference between the results achieved 
by the second and third parameterizations can be 
clearly seen. The comparison of the different parame-
terizations’ performances allows taking an important 
conclusion: when it is required for the simulations to 
improve the processing times, a criterious reduction 
of the search space may not represent a significant 
decrease of the method’s effectiveness. As proven by 
simulation 2, which even though considering fewer 
scenarios and possible bids than the parameterization 
of simulation 3, its results were still acceptable for 
situations for which the method’s processing time is 
crucial. 
Regarding the comparison between the use of the 
game theory strategy and the other two comparing 
strategies, it is visible that the first parameterization 
of the proposed strategy achieves lower results than 
the two reference strategies. This was expected and it 
is easily justified by the low number of scenarios and 
possible bids that this parameterization concerned. 
The second parameterization achieves very similar 
results to the ones obtained by the two reference 
strategies. This means that, even using an intermedi-
ate number of scenarios and bids, the proposed game 
theory strategy is capable of achieving levels of per-
formance that are similar to the results of reference 
and well established strategies. In what concerns to 
the third parameterization, it is capable of achieving 
best results than any of the other strategies, for the 
considered days. This is a motivating result, suggest-
ing that the proposed method is able to provide better 
results to a market negotiating player’s actions, when 
the parameters are suitably defined. 
5. Conclusions and Future work 
This paper proposed a computational model for 
bid definition in electricity markets. The proposed 
method uses a scenario analysis algorithm based on 
the principles of game theory to evaluate and preview 
different scenarios and react strategically. The pro-
posed method is integrated in MASCEM, an electric-
ity market simulator developed by the authors’ re-
search centre. 
The model proves to be adequate for providing de-
cision support to electricity markets players, allowing 
an analysis of different scenarios, taking into account 
the predictions of competitor players’ actions. 
The results presented in the experimental findings 
section show that it can achieve good results when 
using suitable parameterizations, as in simulation 3. 
These good results are also shown not to be directly 
proportional to the scenarios search space, which is a 
relevant aspect when dealing with timely exigent 
simulations. This conclusion facilitates the adaptabil-
ity of the decision making process regarding the 
method’s efficiency and effectiveness. 
Additionally, when comparing the results of the 
proposed game theory strategy with the performance 
of two other well documented and reference strate-
gies, it was found that this strategy is capable of 
achieving best results when the parameters are de-
fined correctly. In fact, even when opting by a faster 
but less broad approach (parameterization with less 
considered scenarios and a smaller action domain), 
the game theory strategy was still able to achieve 
results in the same range as the reference strategies.  
Considering the improvement of this method, fur-
ther work will be done in what concerns a detailed 
analysis in the neighborhood of the scenario selected 
by the algorithm. To achieve this, an evolutionary 
approach will be included and combined with the 
game theory. 
Acknowledgments 
This work is supported by FEDER Funds through 
the “Programa Operacional Factores de 
Competitividade - COMPETE” program and by Na-
tional Funds through FCT “Fundação para a Ciência 
e a Tecnologia” under the project: FCOMP-01-0124-
FEDER-PEst-OE/EEI/UI0760/2011. 
References 
[1] Ahmadlou M. and Adeli, H., “Enhanced Probabilistic Neural 
Network with Local Decision Circles: A Robust Classifier,” 
Integrated Computer-Aided Engineering,  17:3, pp. 197-210, 
2010 
[2] Badaway, R., et al., “Agent-Based Coordination Techniques 
for Matching Supply and Demand in Energy Networks,” Inte-
grated Computer-Aided Engineering, 17:4, pp. 373-382, 2010 
[3] Bandyopadhyay, S., "Multiobjective Simulated Annealing for 
Fuzzy Clustering With Stability and Validity," IEEE Transac-
tions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications 
and Reviews,  41:5, pp.682-691, 2011 
[4] Baraldi, P., et al., “Genetic algorithm-based wrapper approach 
for grouping condition monitoring signals of nuclear power 
plant components,” Integrated Computer-Aided Engineering,  
18:3, pp.  221-234, 2011 
[5] Ceppi, S. and Gatti, N., "An algorithmic game theory study of 
wholesale electricity markets based on central auction", Inte-
grated Computer-Aided Engineering, 17:1, pp. 273-290, 2010 
[6] Cristaldi L., et al., “Multi-agent Systems: an Example of Pow-
er System Dynamic Reconfiguration,” Integrated Computer-
Aided Engineering, 17:4, pp. 359-372, 2010 
[7] Dahabiah, A., et al., “Fusion of possibilistic sources of evi-
dences for pattern recognition,” Integrated Computer-Aided 
Engineering,  17:2, pp. 117-130, 2010 
[8] Dore, A. and Regazzoni, C., “Interaction Analysis with a 
Bayesian Trajectory Model”, IEEE Intelligent Systems, 25:3, 
pp. 32–40, 2010 
[9] Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Notice of White 
Paper”, U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 4:28, 
2003 
[10]  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Report to Congress 
on competition in the wholesale and retail markets for electric 
energy”, U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Avail-
able: http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/fed-sta/ene-pol-
act/epact-final-rpt.pdf 
[11]  Freitag, S., et al., "Recurrent neural networks for fuzzy data", 
Integrated Computer-Aided Engineering, 18:1, pp. 265-280, 
2011 
[12]  Jing, Z., et al., “Study on the convergence property of re 
learning model in electricity market simulation”, Advances in 
Power System Control, Operation and Man-agement, 2009 
[13]  Juang, C. and Lu, C., "Ant Colony Optimization Incor-
porated With Fuzzy Q-Learning for Reinforcement Fuzzy 
Control", IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernet-
ics, Part A: Systems and Humans, 39:3, pp. 597-608, 2009 
[14]  Koritarov, V., “Real-World Market Representation with 
Agents: Modeling the Electricity Market as a Complex Adap-
tive System with an Agent-Based Approach”, IEEE Power & 
Energy magazine, pp. 39-46, 2004 
[15]  Li, H. and Tesfatsion, L., “Development of Open Source 
Software for Power Market Research: The AMES Test Bed”, 
Journal of Energy Markets, 2:2, pp. 111-128, 2009 
[16]  Neumann, J., et al., “The essence of game theory”, IEEE 
Potentials, 22:2, 2003 
[17]  Operador del Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Polo Español – 
homepage, http://www.omie.es, accessed on December 2011 
[18]  Pinto, T., et al., “Cost Dependent Strategy for Electricity 
Markets Bidding Based on Adaptive Reinforcement Learning”, 
International Conference on Intelligent System Application on 
Power Systems - ISAP, 2011 
[19]  Praça, I., et al., “MASCEM: A Multi-Agent System that 
Simulates Competitive Electricity Markets”. IEEE Intelligent 
Systems - Special Issue on Agents and Markets, 18:6, pp. 54-
60, 2003 
[20]  Prymek M. and Horak, A., “Multi-agent Approach to Power 
Distribution Network Modelling,” Integrated Computer-Aided 
Engineering, 17:4, pp. 291-303, 2010 
[21]  Reuter, U., “A Fuzzy Approach for Modelling Non-stochastic 
Heterogeneous Data in Engineering Based on Cluster Analy-
sis,” Integrated Computer-Aided En-gineering,  18:3, pp. 281-
289, 2011 
[22]  Santos, G., et al., “Complex Market integration in MASCEM 
electricity market simulator”, International Conference on the 
European Energy Market 11 – EEM, 2011 
[23]  Shahidehpour M., et al., “Market Operations in Electric Pow-
er Systems: Forecasting, Scheduling, and Risk Management”, 
Wiley-IEEE Press, pp. 233-274, 2002 
[24]  Tellidou, A. and Bakirtzis, A., “Agent-Based Analysis of 
Monopoly Power in Electricity Markets”, International Con-
ference on Intelligent Systems Applications to Power Systems, 
2007 
[25]  Vale, Z., et al., “MASCEM - Electricity markets simulation 
with strategically acting players”, IEEE Intelligent Systems - 
Special Issue on AI in Power Systems and Energy Markets, 
26:2, pp. 54-60, 2011 
[26]  Vale, Z., et al., “VPP’s Multi-Level Negotiation in Smart 
Grids and Competitive Electricity Markets”, IEEE PES Gen-
eral Meeting - PES-GM, 2011 
[27]  Wandekokem, et al., “Diag-nosing multiple faults in oil rig 
motor pumps using support vector machine classifier ensem-
bles", Integrated Computer-Aided Engineering,  18:1, pp. 61-
74, 2011 
 
 
